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ABSTRACT
Mystic Identifications: Reading Kenneth Burke and “Non-Identification”
through Asian American Rhetoric
Nathan D. Wood
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
Krista Ratcliffe’s term “non-identification” offers a version of identification that assumes
identity is not always identifiable. As an attitude that fosters cross-cultural listening, nonidentification asks us to listen to others from a place of “neutrality,” with “hesitancy,”
“humility,” and “pause” in order to consider identity’s fluid nature (73). This thesis first argues
that this term might also describe speaking strategies premised on non-identifiability. As I will
show, an inventive non-identification would articulate some rhetorical strategies that neither
“identification” nor “disidentification” currently articulate. However, rhetorical scholars need
more theoretical and practical guidance for what this kind of speech looks like. So, this thesis
also argues why, despite criticism to the contrary, the writing of Kenneth Burke offers an ideal
account for inventive non-identification. Burke’s descriptions of the terms “synecdoche
function,” the “mystic” and “poetic language” achieve the same effects as Ratcliffe’s nonidentification, yet Burke describes these same effects from the perspective of the speaker.
Following my re-reading of Burke, I ground the theory of inventive non-identification in a brief
rhetorical analysis of Yan Phou Lee’s 1887 autobiography When I Was a Boy in China. By
showing how this theory applies to Asian American rhetoric, I conclude that inventive nonidentification has utility for the field of rhetoric more broadly.
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Introduction
Asian American rhetoric is searching for an identity. In Representations: Doing Asian
American Rhetoric, LuMing Mao and Morris Young ask us to consider what a scholar of Asian
American rhetoric should do. Certainly, much like literary or historical approaches to Asian
America, the rhetorical scholar should pursue the “recovery and discovery” of previously elided
Asian American voices and texts (325). Yet Mao and Young urge us to consider how we might
recover these voices from an explicitly rhetorical approach. In fact, the explicitly rhetorical
approach to Asian America has also been elided and ignored. “Dominant disciplinary
discourses,” such as literature or history, “have often marginalized rhetoric as a discipline and
mode of inquiry,” say Mao and Young (327). As a result, these two leading Asian American
rhetorical scholars encourage rhetoricians to investigate what a distinctly rhetorical approach
adds to the understanding of Asian American studies in general (327).
This thesis argues that rhetorical scholars can study Asian America from a distinctly
rhetorical perspective by reconfiguring rhetorical scholar Krista Ratcliffe’s listening strategy,
“non-identification,” into a what I will call “inventive non-identification,” which might
complement the use of two extant figures of speech, “identification” and “disidentification,”
commonly employed in Asian American studies. Whereas many Asian American scholars
typically use identification to describe the interpolative effect of dominant discourse on
minorities, and whereas disidentification typically articulates the minority attempt to revise these
interpolative discourses, reconfiguring Ratcliffe’s non-identification as a figure of inventive
speech might articulate the ways speakers draw audience attention to identity’s fluid, multiple,
and heterogeneous character. So, if inventive non-identification manages to make such a new
tool, the central focus of this paper is fashioning a theoretical and practical precedent for the
term.
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Several notable Asian American literary critics have documented the representation of
self as fluid, multiple, heterogenous, invisible, or ambiguous through many different theoretical
frameworks and terms, which suggest Asian American scholars of all disciplinary stripes might
also put non-identification to use. For example, among other considerations, King-Kok Cheung’s
Articulate Silences analyzes how the ambiguous “silence” of twentieth-century Asian American
female authors disrupts “monologic” discourses such as racism or sexism (15). And Jennifer Ann
Ho’s Racial Ambiguity documents how mixed race Asian American subjects refuse to identify
with one singular racial heritage, and in so doing, subvert binary or hierarchical conceptions of
race (21). Perhaps influenced by poststructuralist thinkers such as Hélène Cixous or Gloria
Anzaldúa, many other Asian Americanists have shown how, if racism relies on singular or
essentialist understandings of identity, radical Asian American subjecthood should be understood
as ambiguous, fluid, or heterogenous (Lowe 24).
It appears Ratcliffe’s account of listening begins to equip non-identification to articulate
similar strategies. Non-identification asks listeners to communicate with the “cross-cultural
other” with an attitude of “hesitancy,” “humility,” “pause,” and further asks them to seek a place
of “neutrality” (73). Neutrally situated, listeners might better remember the inherently partial
nature of language and listen for “that- which- cannot- be- heard,” which may well include the
multiple, ambiguous, or heterogenous discourses out of which identity is comprised. Put most
succinctly, non-identification appears ready to describe any approach to rhetoric, not just
listening ones, that assumes identity may not always be identifiable (78).
However, because Ratcliffe explores the term principally as a listening strategy,
rhetorical scholars should investigate ways to fashion the term so that it also articulates invention
strategies. Especially because the terms identification and disidentification describe not just
attitudes towards listening, but also inventive speech, non-identification should also describe
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speech if rhetorical scholars want to employ the term as a new, third option to these previous two
terms. How should inventive non-identification be defined? What figures of speech might it
describe?
So, if an inventive version of the term would provide Asian American scholars a new
theoretical vocabulary, one that articulates what neither identification nor disidentification can,
and if Ratcliffe’s work almost provides such vocabulary, this paper non-identification refashions
non-identification as an invention strategy that might specifically describe resistance strategies of
racial minorities. To provide a theoretical and practical guidance for the term, this paper looks
back to the rhetorical tradition and Kenneth Burke to provide a re-reading of a few of his
commonly overlooked insights on identification. Such a re-reading of Burke indicates that his
version of this term might actually apply to many approaches to rhetoric, outside of those
described in his more commonly cited definition of the term in A Rhetoric of Motives. In fact,
through various other terms such as the “synecdoche function,” the “mystic,” and “poetic
meaning,” Burke describes how rhetors might identify themselves as anything but identifiable in
a way that complements Ratcliffe’s non-identification as listening. Like Ratcliffe, Burke’s
description of these terms valorized careful and hesitant approaches to rhetoric, since language
offered not a “reflection” of reality, but a “selection” (LSA 45). Yet unlike Ratcliffe, Burke’s
rhetorical theory explores and defined not one but many patterns of speech that appear to achieve
this same careful and hesitant effect. As rhetors employ the “synecdoche function,” they identify
themselves as one part of a greater, non-visible whole, and in so doing, emphasize their slippery
and non-identifiable character (PLF 510). And, as they practice “poetic meaning,” rhetors
approach language and meaning dialectically, and thus invite listeners to identify others by what
cannot be identified (PLF 147). As I will show, these figures of speech inform what Burke
means by his elusive metaphor, “the mystic.” Just as the eastern mystic transcends the realm of
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desire and transience, rhetors should transcend the ultimately shallow realm of signification and
identify themselves as non-essential entities using language and symbols that directly refers to
such non-essence (P&C 95). And although I make no connection here between Burke’s eastern
mystic and the easterner’s experience in America, these mystical, inventive non-identifications
offer scholars or marginal identities a new term to analyze very similar resistance strategies.
I organize this paper by first offering a brief review of the early-twentieth-century
understanding of identification as well as the late-twentieth-century understanding of
disidentification. This initial segment suggests that neither term has articulated the strategic
presentation of non-identifiability, and that Ratcliffe’s non-identification begins offers rhetorical
scholars a term that can. Next, I address some general objections to Burke’s rhetorical theory in
general, and then provide a piecemeal reading across several of Burke’s key works to explain
what he may have said about inventive non-identification. I conclude with a close reading of Yan
Phou Lee’s important early Asian American autobiography When I Was a Boy in China (1887)
to show how Asian American scholars of all disciplines might use inventive non-identification to
illuminate similar texts. As I’ll show, inventive non-identification provides a more expansive
understanding of Lee’s text than does the modernist understanding of identification or the
poststructuralist understanding of disidentification. Ultimately, I will argue that expanding and
applying Ratcliffe’s term to Asian American concerns through Burke, a uniquely rhetorical
theorist, exemplifies similar kinds of recovery efforts other Asian American rhetoricians might
perform hoping to define Asian American rhetoric.
Identification’s Demise
In its late nineteenth-, early-twentieth-century conception, identification referred to the
conscious and unconscious psychological process by which an individual assimilates foreign
properties, aspects, or characteristics into the self (Meissner 563). Influenced by Freud, Kenneth
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Burke described in particular how rhetorical symbols assist in this process (Davis 124). Because
you “persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality,”
rhetoric was only effective inasmuch as it influenced identity (RM 55). Replacing “persuasion”
with “identification” was Burke’s way of emphasizing that all forms of persuasion performed a
“naming and changing” effect on identity (RM xiv, ATH 285).
Identification has remained an important critical heuristic in rhetorical studies. Many
rhetorical scholars use the term to describe a wide variety of rhetorical processes. Identification
has been used to describe instances of successful rhetorical interactions, as when speakers find
“common ground” with their audiences (Cheney 143). Gregory Clark says identification can also
describe deliberation and dialogue. Through identification, nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Americans negotiated their national identification both individually and collectively (Clark 136).
Identification has also been used to describe ways minority rhetors resist hegemonic discourse.
Asian American rhetorical scholar Bo Wang uses identification to describe how fictionist Sui Sin
Far subverted “stereotypical expectations” as she offered alternative images of Asian women in
late-nineteenth-century America (254). Today, rhetorical scholars appear committed to continue
using identification to understand resistance. Rhetoric Society of America’s 2012 biennial
conference was titled “Re/framing Identification.” Michelle Ballif reflects that this conference
investigated identification as a distinctly political “place of perpetual reframing,” which “affects
who, how, and what can be thought, spoken, written, and imagined” (Ballif 1).
However, in the majority of contemporary uses outside of rhetorical studies, the term
identification (not just Burke’s version) rarely, if ever, articulates resistance. Identification today
especially articulates the workings of “hegemony,” “interpolation,” “enculturation,” or other
terms that describe the means by which individuals become subjects within a cultural order
(Wess 9). In Identification Papers, Diana Fuss explains that Freudian identification best lends
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itself to cultural and psychological attempts to consolidate power because the term maintains a
binarized hierarchy that separates outside from in. Necessarily, identifications cannot exist
without the creation or “detour through” the “other,” not even apparently benign or apolitical
identifications (Fuss 143). Consequently, for Fuss, the term does not readily articulate resistance
strategies that seek true, non-binarized inclusion: any “serious [recuperation] of a politics of
identification” must eschew this hierarchical tendency (141).
But Burke’s version of the term in particular has also received critique. Rhetorical scholar
James Zappen argues that Burke’s description in A Rhetoric of Motives relies on a similar
hierarchy. There, Burke described identification as “compensatory to division,” by which he
meant identification could bring people closer together, as Clark describes, yet in his critique,
Zappen says that unity in one place breeds division in others (RM 22). While it is true that “when
we identify with another person, idea, or group, we overcome our divisions,” we also
“thereby...divide ourselves from someone or something else” (289). Like Fuss, Zappen
concludes that any truly inclusive political program must find a way to unify people without
dividing them hierarchically, and so neither can Burke’s identification serve as a basis for any
truly emancipatory resistance politics.
Although these analyses of identification might ignore other important aspects of Freud
and Burke’s work, even Clark notes the process of identification has some exclusionary effects
(63). In most cultural studies scholarship today, perhaps because of these critiques,
“identification” actually describes the structures minority subjects oppose, not the means those
minorities employ to subvert them. Identification stands in for terms like heteronormativity,
patriarchy, or other processes that uphold racism, sexism, and even ableism. For example, in
Asian American literary studies, Viet Nguyen uses identification to describe how fictionist
Onoto Watanna navigated the American reading public. Watanna could “pass” as white, which
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would grant her the “social license to be... ‘free’” (36). Or, she could emphasize her Asian
heritage and face “racial identification” (36). In this use, Nguyen employs identification to
highlight Watanna’s restricted authorial choices, and many other cultural studies projects use
identification in similar ways.
Besides critiques like Fuss and Zappen’s, identification may not readily articulate
resistance because of increased popularity of an alternative term: disidentification. In fact, this
term was theorized in the 1990s as a direct response to the shortcomings of its antecedent term.
Strongly leading off of deconstructive thinkers like Jacques Derrida, scholars across all
disciplines first employed the term to highlight the inevitable othering tendency of identificatory
discourse. Rendered (dis)identification, the term reminded us that although the identifier may
fantasize otherwise, we cannot identify an “ingroup” without necessarily (dis)identifying an
“outgroup” (Fuss 10, Butler 63). In this sense, the term was used to describe the behaviors of
hegemonic forces as identification does now, yet using (dis)identification underscored that such
attempts to fix identity represent the ruling class’s power fantasy.
Today however, the term signifies minority resistance. In Bodies that Matter, Judith
Butler agreed that (dis)identification can be used to designate identification’s naive power
fantasy, but also explores the “possibilities of politicizing disidentification” as means of
resistance (Butler 219). If (dis)identification is in fact an act of fantasy, we should reason that
those in power cannot sustain it. Logically, such fantastical thinking must leave open some
window of opportunity through which minority subjects might “disidentify” the means of their
oppression (Butler 219). José Esteban Muñoz takes off with Butler’s disidentification and
fashions it into a fully systematized theory of resistance. Now rendered without the parenthesis,
Muñoz’s term primarily articulated how minorities exploit such power fantasies: it is through the
inside of the dominant majority, rather than from without or against, that minorities reinterpret
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oppressive cultural forms (21). Disidentification thus “neither opts to assimilate within such a
structure nor strictly opposes it,” but rather “tactically and simultaneously works on, with, and
against a cultural form” (11). Many scholars reading Muñoz alternatively used the term
“queering” to describe this kind of revision, yet both terms articulate something similar: that real
cultural revolution occurs through revision, reconfiguration, or reinterpretation of the existing
terms of oppression. Especially because so many resistance strategies can be described as
revisionary (representation might as well be articulated re-presentation), disidentification has
become preferred over identification to describe how minorities self-authorize identity. In fact,
disidentification and identification often get used in tandem, and in such cases, disidentification
almost always describes the resistant strategies of the minority, and identification almost always
describes the strategies of those in power.
Disidentification’s Limits
However, there are still some forms of resistance that scholars do not use disidentification
to articulate, such as the portrayal of the self as fluid, ambiguous, or non-essential. This kind of
strategy is in fact well documented throughout the humanities. Many literary and rhetorical
critics have demonstrated how the portrayal of identity in such ambiguous, fluid, or invisible
ways might yield political benefits. Riding the impetus of Derrida, Foucault, and Barthes,
poststructural feminists of the 1960s and 70s considered how female authored texts, once
silenced and ignored, might reassert political visibility by asserting invisibility. As one literary
anthology has summarized it, presenting the self as a “splintered multiplicity” creates “an
indifferent identity” that questions forms of power from an ambiguous, askance position (Ryan
897). What Julia Kristeva finds in the French poet Comte de Lautreamont, Helen Cixous finds in
James Joyce: rather than projecting definite or legible identities, écriture féminine projected
ambiguity, multiplicity, fluidity, or in other words, inessence. Later feminists like Gloria
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Anzaldúa would later work towards a writing approach that disrupted both patriarchal and
feminist hegemony marked by a “tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity” (101).
These resistance strategies also seem commonplace in Asian American studies. Heavily
influenced by these poststructural and feminist scholars, King-Kok Cheung says in Articulate
Silences that as Asian American authors such as Maxine Kingston, Joy Kogawa, Yamamamoto
employ indirect or silent strategies such as “double voiced discourse” and “coded speaking,”
their characters “subvert a monologic reality” (5,19). In Racial Ambiguity, Jennifer Ann Ho has
described how being of mixed race, or “hapa,” descendance enables resistance. As Asian
American hapa refuse simple racial categorizations “predicated on binary constructions and
fixity,” such as white or non-white, they refute not just specific stereotypes about race, but the
very hierarchizing and fixating force of racial discourse itself (21). Cheung and Ho are just two
examples of this general strategy. Especially following Lisa Lowe’s 1991 noted critique of
simplistic conceptions of Asian American identity, countless Asian American literary, historical,
anthropological, and linguistic scholars have documented intentional indirectness, ambiguity, or
multiplicity as forms of resistance. In fact, the very term “Asian America” does not always
adequately describe the truly eclectic and heterogeneous demographic it represents (Palumbo-Liu
1). In whatever the discipline or context, this brand of Asian American scholarship assumes the
poststructuralist maxim that, if discursive powers such as racism, sexism, or heteronormativity
assume fixed and hierarchical conceptions of identity, then truly subversive strategies must not
re-assert more fixity, coercion, or hierarchy, but instead polyphony, heterogeneity, fluidity and
non-essence.
And yet, disidentification, a distinctly poststructural creation, only sometimes articulates
the portrayal of identity as non-essential in the ways these scholars—whether influenced by
Kristeva, Cixous, Anzaldúa, or Lowe—describe. Most uses of disidentification in literary,

10
rhetorical, or performance criticism use the term to emphasize the ends of resistance, not the
means. As disidentification emphasizes that truly emancipatory subversion takes aim at
hegemony from within, on already existing forms of culture, it places stronger emphasis on the
centrality of revision in emancipatory strategies than it does the means by such revision occurs.
For example, communication scholar Anjali Vats describes in 2016 how Andy Warhol’s painting
entitled Mammy “reifies...remakes,” and “reimagines” (notice the common pre-fix re-) existing
racial and gender stereotypes (237). While Vats does not deny that such reimagining may occur
by presenting the self as non-identifiable, her use of disidentification does not emphasize this
detail. Similarly, rhetorical scholar Ashley P. Farrell has described the revision of an American
policy decision that disproportionately favored white Americans ahead of other minorities, and
her use of disidentification primarily explores the fact such emancipatory rhetoric occurred
through revision. Like Vats, no hint of multiplicity, invisibility, or non-essence plays a part in
her analysis (533).
Interestingly, Butler and Muñoz do explain in their systematic formulations of
disidentification that the presentation of identity as non-identifiable may be considered
disidentificatory. In Bodies that Matter, Butler implies that a truly inclusive and intersectional
feminism requires that we represent womanhood ambiguously, as not simply a revision of the
signifier “woman,” but of a perpetually revisable, and thus indefinitely ambiguous,
representamen. Instead of revising the patriarchy with an essentialist definition of Woman, we
should instead revise it proffering a more open-ended concept of “woman” (239). Munoz also
illustrates a version of disidentification he calls “performing disidentity” (161). Performing
disidentity revises existing cultural forms while “refusing to participate in a particular
representational economy” (165). For example, performance artist Félix González-Torres revised
heteronormative stereotypes without asserting any kind of legible identity markings. González-
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Torres absented traces of his LGBT, Cubano identity, which refused to “simply invoke identity,
and instead to connote it” (165).
If Vats and Ferrell’s use of disidentification is in any way indicative of the term’s general
use, it appears disidentification has not lived up to its theoretical potential as detailed by Butler
and Munoz. Fuss and performance scholar Amelia Jones also indicate there may be forms of
resistance “disidentification” does not always articulate. Both have employed disidentification in
their approaches towards literature and performance studies, yet both still imply we look for yet
other terms to describe identificatory politics. Although Fuss spends much time in her book,
Identification Papers, with disidentification, she also hopes we “take seriously the
poststructuralist notion that our most impassioned identifications may incorporate nonidentity
within them” (Fuss 10, emphasis mine). And Jones asks that we continue to look towards a way
of “seeing differently,” by recognizing the “multiple, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory
ways” identity manifests itself (7). Jones also cites disidentification as one of the main
theoretical rationales upon which we should revise this new way of seeing, yet, like Fuss, she
looks towards a term disidentification cannot fully articulate (2). We need a version of
identification that centrally articulates the portrayal of identity as non-essential.
Rhetoric’s Opportunity: Ratcliffe’s Interpretive Non-Identification
Disidentification’s inability to articulate intentional ambiguity grants rhetorical scholars a
window of opportunity. Non-identification might pick up precisely where disidentification has
become delimited. Although this difference may seem like a small squabble over semantics and
vocabulary, it implies real disciplinary consequences. We should note that as employed in
disciplines such as literature, history, philosophy, and communication, disidentification is almost
always credited as a distinctly performance and queer studies creation. So, if it is true that
humanist scholars see disidentification as performance studies’ contribution to our pan-
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disciplinary understanding of resistance, non-identification might also be recognized as
rhetoric’s contribution to this same pan-disciplinary endeavor.
Krista Ratcliffe nudges rhetorical scholars towards making this contribution. Her
description of non-identification appears to pick up right where disidentification leaves off.
Whereas disidentification, now primarily foregrounding revision, only secondarily indicates
strategic ambiguity, non-identification might primarily document strategic ambiguity. Put
differently, non-identification might describe not the target or site of subversive acts (i.e.
towards the revision of existing cultural forms), but the means by which this subversion occurs,
specifically through strategic “disharmony” or through the presentation of self as “complex and
multiple” (Ratcliffe 74, 76).
Ratcliffe’s listening leaves us with a few important clues for creating an inventive version
of the term. Ratcliffe outlines three principal listening strategies, all of which invoke nonidentifiability in different ways and to different extents. First, Ratcliffe explains how listeners
practice non-identification by simply loosening the interpretive grip with which the listen to their
interlocuters. This is what it means to listen metonymically. “Metonymic listening” assumes that
identity can be at least somewhat identifiable, yet less identifiable than we might immediately
expect (Ratcliffe 78). For example, metonymic listening means translating what “to be” into
“might be,” or “will not” to “not necessarily.”
Ratcliffe says non-identification might ask listeners to consider ambiguity to a greater
degree, through “eavesdropping.” Eavesdropping asks us to listen to interpretants as composed
of “multiple” or plural discourses (76). Ratcliffe says we can listen this way by pushing
ourselves to stand back far enough, as it were, to recognize that those we listen to are composed
of multiple discourses simultaneously. This listening requires “multiple hearings” (Ratcliffe 76).
The crucial habit here is finding a wide enough vantage point so we can “[listen] to learn,” and
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therefore “[grant] others the inside position” (105). In practice, this habit has an expanding effect
on our interpretation, which allows us to see how race, gender, and sex function as only one of
many other discourses that inform personhood. Most succinctly, we practice eavesdropping
when we change our listening vantage point and in so doing recognize how identity might be
seen as too expansive or complex to be reduced to singular identifications.
Ratcliffe describes yet a third way to practice non-identification. Whereas the second
type of listening asks us to consider identity’s complex nature, this third type of listening asks us
to consider language’s inadequacies. This listening assumes that identity is not multiple, but
whole, and that consequently we should see all identity markers as artificial or false. These two
final strategies may seem like two sides of the same coin, but they make two different
assumptions about the nature of the self and of language. Whereas the former strategy sees
identity as multiple, this third strategy sees identity as whole; and, whereas the former assumes
language sufficiently articulates the self if only we provide “multiple hearings,” the third sees
language as mostly destructive or ultimately inadequate. In practice, Ratcliffe says this third type
of listening asks us to distrust the realm of signification. This type of listening imagines “X and
Y... not as subject and object but as two very different subjects” that may not ultimately be
mutually interpretable, identifiable, or communicable (73). This listening admits that crosscultural identification may remain perpetually ambiguous because it “may not succeed” (76).
The fact that Ratcliffe details these three forms of non-identification guides what an
inventive version of the term might look like. But, as Ratcliffe explains, non-identification for
her applies only to listening, and further, non-identification describes the listening habits of those
in power. Guidance on the rhetorical art of listening should be directed to those charged typically
with not listening, which are, almost by definition, those in power. But applying nonidentification to Asian American studies should approach the term from the converse
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perspective. If people of privilege should listen tenuously, for multiplicity, or holistically, how
should minorities speak if they wish to achieve these same effects? Specifically, what figures or
tropes of speech can inventive non-identification be defined by? And, how can we articulate nonidentification on a theoretical level? What can we offer by way of coherent definition?
Burke’s Inventive Non-identification
Kenneth Burke speaks to all three main registers of ambiguity both Ratcliffe and Asian
American scholars describe. Whereas Ratcliffe describes tentative and careful listening, Burke
describes how minorities present themselves with this same tentativeness through the
“synecdoche function” (PLF 27). And whereas Ratcliffe asks us to listen to multiplicity, Burke
describes speech that relays multiple discourses simultaneously through “poetic meaning” (PLF
147). Lastly, whereas Ratcliffe asks listeners to consider how individuals may be considered
whole without our interpretive identification of them, Burke calls speaking in a way that
dissolves language’s sometimes delusionary effect the “disintegrating art” (CS 105)
However, there are plenty of rhetorical scholars who would argue Burke does not
complement Ratcliffe. We need to first consult these critiques, especially since Burke’s version
of identification has been described with adjectives antithetical to the ones Ratcliffe uses.
Rhetorical scholars often turn to the same rather slim description of identification in A Rhetoric
of Motives to rationalize these critiques. “To identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’
with B,” Burke says, and such consubstantiality is the key to “overcoming” our “division” (RM
22). On top of observing Zappen’s critique regarding identification’s hierarchical tendency,
Janice Odom points out that “consubstantiality” restricts the range of rhetorical activity that can
be described as identificatory, especially persuasion that does the opposite of consubstantiate,
that is, to divide or make dissimilar (245). Dominic Ashby says that, as he “supposes a relatively
static self,” Burke did not envision the kind of poststructuralist identities many of the
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aforementioned Asian American scholars emphasize. Consequently, using identification better
describes the ‘consubstantiation’ of simpler, less complex identities (312). In fact, Krista
Ratcliffe comes up with non-identification specifically because she find’s Burke’s identification
insufficient as a model for listening (53). Burke’s term functions as a “coercive force” that
“demands commonalities” between individuals “at the expense of differences” (47). Ratcliffe
concludes that, as Zappen and Fuss point out, Burke’s term better lends itself to describe the
techniques of those in power (58).
All of these critiques seem to point us away from Burke as we search for a precedent for
non-identification as invention. However, “identification” was Burke’s central term, which
means all of his vast collection of writings should be seen as an approach to it, not just the
section in A Rhetoric of Motives he dedicates to defining it (RM xiv). Approached from this
wider view, Burke’s other writing, writing that may be consider secondary descriptions of
identification, can hardly be labeled essentialist, and further, complements Ratcliffe’s listening
with thorough description of non-identificatory speech.
Before I discuss why Burke provides the ideal inventive complement to Ratcliffe’s nonidentificatory listening, I need to briefly sum up some of Burke’s big themes. Most broad
overviews of Burke’s work argue Burke was most centrally concerned with the epistemological
function of language (Wess 2, Wolin 204). Burke was a constructionist: “what we mean by
‘reality’ has been built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems” (LSA 5). Language did
not merely “reflect reality”—it constituted it (11). Much like the many postmodernists to whom
he has been compared, Burke saw this as reason to grow cautious. Any rhetorical utterance
constituted only one ‘selection’ among many other possible interpretations of reality (11). These
rhetorical selections were often based only on the “tiny sliver of reality we [have] experienced
firsthand” (LSA 5). In most cases, to use language was to simplify the complex “discrepant and
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conflicting stimuli” it hoped to describe (P&C 45). Most dramatizations were in fact “a
reduction” more than a representation (GM 64).
Consequently, Burke continually expressed frustration, both in his formal rhetorical
theorizations and his public writings, towards approaches to language that failed to consider the
“discrepant and conflicting stimuli” our speech and listening acts frequently excluded. For
Burke, there was always more to what immediately met the eye, to what was presented through
our “terministic screens” or interpretation (LSA 5). Burke censured attitudes that guaranteed any
kind of easy certainty, such as “positivism” (GM 275). Conversely, Burke praised attitudes that
considered complexity and ambiguity. If language’s primal sin was the too quick and too routine
essentialization of reality, the answer was to introduce complexity back into consideration. If
language essentialized that which rhetoric kept within the dramatic frame, we must cautiously
and hesitantly figure out what it kept without. “Accordingly,” says Burke, “what we want is not
terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities
arise” (GM xvii).
From this brief summary, we should see that he and Ratcliffe share similar concerns. The
same hesitancy and humility that characterize Ratcliffe’s non-identification also describe Burke’s
injunction to “understand a motive where it is not normally recognized” (RM xiv). Historically
speaking, Burke had great reason to become skeptical. After living through the World Wars and
the Great Depression, Burke pleaded with the American public in a 1969 the Nation column to
“consider the puzzlements of identification as they affect our sense of citizenship”
(“Responsibilities of National Greatness” 46). This was because rhetorical communication
confused as much as it clarified, obfuscated as much as it elucidated. After all, rhetoric was the
tool Hitler used to mobilize Germany and bring the world into war (PLF 191).
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Yet Burke did not simply theorize how to interpret or listen to others. Burke’s response to
the puzzlements of identification was not only to listen with pause or caution, but also to speak in
a way that invites this same kind of reflection. This meant that, although identification was
Burke’s key term, he spent much of his writing career describing how the presentation of self as
anything but identifiable might produce this kind of reflection.
First, like Ratcliffe, Burke foresees the ways Asian Americans imbue some amounts of
ambiguity into their self-presentation. Burke articulated this form of directed ambiguity through
the “synecdoche function” of language (PLF 28). Speaking synecdochally would encourage us to
recognize that linguistic symbols function only as “rough, shorthand descriptions” that stand in
for, but do not fully represent, a greater, “discrepant and conflicting,” whole (P&C 45). Seeing
language as synecdoche helped us see language as “suggestion,” which discouraged essentialist
approaches that saw language as “strict definition” (P&C 55). Synecdoche provided “selfinterference” which reminded us that language reported reality only anecdotally (P&C 346). Yet,
ironically, as it brought us further up into the realm of ambiguity, it brought us closer to the
dramatistic truth (“Four Master Tropes” 421).
What results from the use of the synecdoche function is a certain metadiscursive, hedging
effect that calls attention to its own inadequacy. Burke describes what this hedging looks like in
detail in Attitudes Towards History, through a reading of American philosopher William James.
Per Burke, James assumed that knowledge could not be conveyed wholly or self-identically.
“The morality of [James’] craft,” Burke reports, “required that all assertions be checked,” since
“naming could be of too readily consolatory a nature” (ATH 10,7). Consequently, James
constantly conditioned all notions of “truth” with “truthfulness” (8). Burke demonstrated James’
hedged approach to language through his caricature of scientist Herbert Spencer. We should not
say that “evolution,” as Spencer said, is the process “during which matter passes from an
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indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity.” We should instead say,
as James hedges, that “Evolution is a change from a no-howish untalkaboutable all-alikeness to a
somehowish and in general talkaboutable not-all-alikeness.” (11).
This sort of hedging mirrors the kind of interpretive hedging Ratcliffe says defines nonidentification, yet this explanation gives guidance to what non-identificatory speech might look
like. Although there may be small technical differences between metonymy and synecdoche,
both provide “a place wherein people may consciously choose to position themselves” so that
they consider partiality of identifications (Ratcliffe 72). It also appears to parallel what some
scholars of early Asian American literature explain how rhetors project images of Asian
America. For example, Floyd Cheung argues that Yung Wing’s autobiography My Life in China
and America affirmed typical identificatory narratives told about Asian Americans but then
subtly demonstrated why the Asian American experience should not necessarily be identified
homogeneously as white Americans tended to (31).
Burke described another form of inventive non-identification as he described rhetors who
insist on the boundless multiplicity of their personhood. As part philosopher, Burke saw the self
as a compilation of not singular identifications, but of a plurality of identifications. Says Burke,
“the so-called ‘I” is merely a unique combination of partially conflicting ‘corporate we’s’” (ATH
264). Accordingly, to Burke, we should speak in a way that considers the multivalence of our
identities and of our subject matter. As he says in PLF, “poetic meaning” was one way we could
speak in a way that invited heterogeneity. Poetic meaning “would attempt to attain a full moral
act by attaining a perspective atop all the conflicts of attitude” (147). By attaining a perspective
atop all the conflicts of attitude, Burke refers to the many ‘corporate we’s’ of which the I is
comprised. Using speech that achieves poetic meaning “might take many courses” to portray
subject matter sufficiently and might take lots of intense dialogue (143). Conversely, “semantic
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meaning” flattened and simplified subjects by “the elimination of attitude” (147). “Semantic
meaning” would insist that conveying the full meaning of “a chair” would simply require
“pointing to a chair” while saying “‘That thing is a chair’” (143). Semantic meaning fantasizes
that language always faithful adheres to authorial intentions, or as Burke says elsewhere,
semantic aspires towards the “bureaucratization of the imaginative” (ATH 141). As the much
more preferable option, says Burke biographer Ross Wolin, “poetic” meaning is “language that
allows otherwise different or even contradictory statements to exist side by side” (64).
Poetic meaning complements Ratcliffe’s injunction to listen for multiplicity. Both
thinkers assume that “a person’s identity encompasses more than a single identification,” and
both describe how to listen or speak in a way that reflects this assumption (Ratcliffe 51).
Whereas Ratcliffe says non-identification requires “multiple hearings,” Burke’s poetic meaning
calls for multivariant speech. Further, poetic meaning might describe the Asian American
portrayal of self as fragmented, multiple, plural, or otherwise too complex to be reduced to
singular identification. Some Asian American scholars explain how speakers refer to themselves
as “double” through “double voice discourse,” or as “multivalent” with terms like “palimpsest
techniques” (Magosaki 11). Others explain some specific techniques speakers employ to portray
this multivalent non-identifiability such as various post-modern approaches to narrative and
point of view, by switching between dialects or languages, or even by blending fact and fiction.
For example, K.K. Cheung’s influential book Articulate Silences documents how three Asian
American women fictionists practice several of these approaches. Maxine Kingston “recreates
the past” of her Chinese heritage “by presenting multiple, often mutually exclusive versions of
ancestral stories,” while Joy Kogawa intertwines verifiable fact and with folk story and fable into
her fiction, and further “deploys both Western and Eastern fables to connect past and present”
(123,156). Both these writers, along with Hisaye Yamamoto, write characters marked more by
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“provocative silence” than speech. As Cheung shows, this silence yields “multiple answers” and
refuses to offer singular portrayals of self and ancestry (124).
Burke also described what appears similar to Ratcliffe’s third form of non-identification.
In effect, this form of speech dissolves artificial or constructed identifications that obscure our
view of the ultimately and already whole identities to which they refer. In Permanence and
Change, Burke says that approaching language as “mystics” would dissolve our false
interpretations of the world and lead to transcendence. If to practice mysticism was to turn from
the realm of appearances, to dissolve the linguistic self was to stand apart from the realm of
epistemology and experience reality holistically (95). As Burke says, seeing all language as nonessential would lead to “withdraw from the realm of appearances” and give way to a “sense of
attainment” or “a oneness with the universal texture” (318). Importantly, linguistic mysticism
involved paying close attention to both interpretation and speech. Making “assertions in vacuo”
meant referring to the self as dissolved (319). “In vacuo” of course might be translated to “in a
vacuum.” Asserting nothingness, or in other words, asserting non-essence helps us approach
language transcendently.
It is not exactly clear what specific behaviors Burke wants rhetoricians to adopt when he
describes this mystic and very theoretical approach to language, since Burke invokes the mystic
throughout his work vaguely and inconsistently. However, if accepting ambiguity defines the
attitude of the mystic, other descriptions of ambiguity in Burke’s work might provide a more
detailed account of how to use it in speech. In Counter-Statement, Burke describes a literary
effect called “obscurantism,” which appears to achieve the same effect as mystical,
epistemological transcendence. Various literary devices such as narrative style or point of view
“convert each simplicity into a complexity…ruins the possibility of ready hierarchies,” and
“concerns itself with the problematical [and] the experimental” (105). Here, although he does not
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mention the mystic, we see the same type of dissolving effect. In fact, later, Burke calls this
effect of fiction “a disintegrating art” (105).
This disintegrating tendency or mysticism roughly corresponds to another type of Asian
American ambiguity. Contrasted against K.K. Cheung’s fragmented and multiple silences, other
Asian American scholarship describes the self as already whole and complete, and therefore noncommunicable. Similar to Jennifer Ann Ho’s racially ambiguous subjects, Leslie Bow refers to
how mid-twentieth-century Asians in the American south presented themselves as “racial
anomalies,” as neither white nor African American nor identifiable by any legible, embodied
forms. These ambiguous subjects did not offer themselves as identifiable but preferred to
position themselves outside the realm of signification altogether. One of Ho’s central anecdotes
illustrates this third attitude. Artist-scholar Kip Fulbeck photographed several “hapa” Asians
naked from the shoulders up, and then asked them the question, “Who Are You?” Ultimately
Fulbeck presented these photographs in an exhibit called “Part Asian*100% Hapa.” Ho says,
“None of the subjects has any other identifying marks: no names, birthdates, or places of
residence accompany these images” (3). As a result, Fulbeck argues that mixed race descendancy
“cannot be contained by the logic of mathematics but instead must reside in a seemingly
paradoxical realm in which one can be,” for example, “both wholly black and wholly Japanese”
(3).
So far, it appears an eclectic collection of Burke’s writings come together to form what
non-identification as invention looks like. To Ratcliffe’s metonymic listening, Burke provides
the synecdoche function of language. And whereas Ratcliffe’s eavesdropping asks listeners to
see identity as multiple and boundless, Burke describes “poetic meaning” which offers the same
invitation. Lastly, whereas Ratcliffe asks us to see how our interlocutors may already be
considered whole without our interpretation of them, Burke asks us to disintegrate speech as
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mystics. For both thinkers, regardless of the specific type of ambiguity invoked, these rhetors
“give more prominence to the subjective elements of imagery than to the objective, or public,
elements” which “[reveals]” the “symbolic quality... more clearly, precisely because the forensic
superstructure erected above it is less firm” (ATH 60).
Non-identification in early Asian American rhetoric
With the help of Floyd Cheung, K.K. Cheung, and Jennifer Ann Ho, I have given just a
brief taste of what non-identificatory speech might look like. So that Asian American scholars
across discipline might continue to use the term, I conclude this paper with a very brief reading
of Yan Phou Lee’s autobiography When I Was A Boy in China (1887). Burkean nonidentification reveals important aspects about the text neither the traditional take on identification
nor the post-structural take on disidentification avails. Whereas Asian Americanists may use
identification to describe how Lee acts as an identificatory cross-cultural diplomat, and whereas
they might use disidentification to describe how Lee revises harmful images of Asians in
America, they might also use non-identification to describe how Lee posits images of Asian
America as provisional, ambiguous, or already whole.
Lee’s late-nineteenth-century autobiography When I Was a Boy in China is the first book
published in English on American soil by an author of Asian descent. Lee was a product of the
Chinese Education Mission, a Chinese government program that placed Chinese students in
American schools so they might receive a more western and technocratic education. Lee
eventually graduated from Harvard and became a public intellectual, publishing editorials
nationwide and serving as somewhat of an expert on Chinese-American relations. Written near
the end of his life, his autobiography thus served as many American readers’ introduction to
Chinese custom and culture. The book spans across Lee’s early childhood in China, which
includes his first contact with America and the first few years of his education. However, Lee’s
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narration clearly has a polemic bent—Lee desperately wants to humanize Chinese lifestyles to
his American audience, especially as American fear Asian immigrants had escalated to
sometimes violent extents.
Thus, the basic premise of this book alone indicates how the book lends itself to a classic
or modernist understanding of Burkean identification. In many scholarly appraisals, Lee is
commonly seen as a hybrid figure who blended East with West and provided white Americans
with images of Asia that the American public would find assimilable. Literary scholar Floyd
Cheung describes the autobiography as an “explanation of [Chinese] culture” and a “valorization
of character” (31). As a member of a more mobile or elite class than many other contemporary
Chinese American immigrants, Lee served as a cultural ‘ambassador of goodwill’ in order to
improve an “image in order to win sympathy and acceptance” (Kim 24, Yin 53).
The terms we associate typically with identification certainly apply. As he entreated his
American readership, one newly exposed to Asian culture through a sudden increase Chinese and
Japanese immigration, Lee seeks common ground. We might say, like Floyd Cheung, that Lee’s
“rhetoric of cross-cultural simile,” was “compensatory” to the “division” between East and West
(28). And we might also say that as he bridged “Chinese and Chinese American culture...with
language that alludes to Greek, Roman, and British cultures” he also made them consubstantial
with one another (29). Lee ‘identified his way with theirs” by “speaking their language...gesture,
tonality, order, image, attitude, [and] idea” (RM 55).
But negotiating between two worlds also certainly involved a great deal of revision,
especially given the racist and even lethal anti-Chinese sentiment of the era. So, as he corrects
erroneous identifications about Asians, Lee also invokes disidentification. Cheung also
demonstrates Lee’s attempt to “change European American attitudes regarding the Chinese” (84,
31). Cheung particularly uses the word “reevaluation” to describe Lee’s attempts (36). In fact,
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Cheung reads When I Was a Boy in China in the same way he reads Lee’s revision of Denis
Kearney’s racist slogan “The Chinese Must Go!” in his polemic “The Chinese Must Stay” (47).
In this essay, Lee lists eleven forceful and succinct reasons why American prejudice towards
Asians is racist, baseless, and ultimately un-patriotic. As it revises these erroneous notions, Lee
disidentifies Kearney’s famous slogan into a more hospitable sentiment: “The Chinese Must
Stay” (476). Within this autobiography, Lee consults many erroneous notions about Asians and
offers with detailed explanation more self-authorized disidentifications. To the extent that Lee’s
entire work can be read as a reauthorization of Chinese immigrant identification,
disidentification can continue to help Asian American scholars who want to understand him.
However, neither of these two terms explain the attempts many Asian Americans made,
not just Lee, to absent themselves from the production or interpolation of identification
altogether, not simply seeking cross-cultural identifications or revisionary disidentifications.
Asian American writers such as Edith Eaton and Yone Noguchi sometimes preferred to withhold
information about their race from their readers. The Japanese American poet Noguchi sometimes
asked readers to ignore his prevalent identification as Asian in order to draw attention to the
more heterogeneous aspects of his personality. Literary scholar Amy Sueyoshi explains that
throughout his career, Noguchi “adamantly refused to allow whites to racialize him,” even to the
point that as he “answered requests for his pictures,” he specifically asked not “to be
photographed in his native dress” (“Miss Morning Glory” 8). Eaton was equally determined to
keep her audiences from identifying her as a racial writer: “After all,” she says in 1890, “I have
no nationality and am not anxious to claim any” (230). While it would be wrong to say that
Noguchi and Eaton totally ignore their racial identities, it would be equally wrong to say they
offer those identities clearly or legibly—or identifiably.
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Similarly, while it is obvious that Yan Phou Lee wanted either to successfully identify his
mostly white American audience with the Asian experience or disidentify erroneous stereotypes,
Lee also removed some traces of his Asian descent outside of his readership’s interpretive grasp.
In other words, even while he demonstrates why his experience does not fully translate
(identify), and even while he passes on the opportunity to revise (disidentify), Lee instead
preemptively prepares a way for a healthier communication between East and West through
offering up three kinds of non-identification we find in Burke.
Lee practices non-identification through Burke’s synecdoche function. While it is
certainly true that Lee tells his life story to inform or ‘identify his ways’ with his American
audience, Lee nuances, hedges and conditions his accounts by saying that his experience may
represent other Chinese experiences, yet this is not always the case. As Burke and Ratcliffe
understand, Lee recognizes the tenuous nature of cross-cultural communication. Throughout the
story, Lee hedges statements that may be interpreted as wholly representative of Chinese culture
writ large. Narrating the death of his father, Lee affirms that other family members step in to
adopt their surviving children. Although such a practice “is common,” Lee conditions his
audience’s understanding of this practice by saying that only “usually” do “adopted sons
[remain] with the family or clan, but not always” (16). While Lee affirms other aspects of
Chinese culture more decisively, for example, that Chinese people are not idolatrous, Lee hedges
many other portrayals of China. About China’s many national and cultural holidays, Lee says “It
would be a matter of many chapters were I to describe all the holidays which we have in China”
(25). Later, Lee says “active sports of the Chinese boys are few…But you must not suppose that
the Chinese boy never plays at all” (34).
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Lee even hedges the “exact date” of his own birth (8). Lee says, “On a certain day in the
year 1861, I was born.” Even basic assumptions about how to keep time cannot be
communicated cleanly:
I cannot give you the exact date, because the Chinese year is different from the English
year, and our months being lunar, that is, reckoned by the revolution of the moon around
the earth, are consequently shorter than yours. We reckon time from the accessions of
Emperors, and also by cycles of sixty years each. The year of my birth, 1861, was the
first year of the Emperor Tung-che. We have twelve months ordinarily; and we say,
instead of ‘January, February,” etc., ‘Regular Moon, Second Moon, Third Moon,” etc.
Each third year is a leap year and has an extra month so as to make each of the lunar
years equal to a solar year. (8)
Amy Ling calls this description, because of its “bewildering complexities as accessions of
emperors and leap year catch-ups,” a “minutely thorough” account of something so basic (280).
According to Ling, this description comes as a result of being “caught between two incompatible
systems,” and in fact “heightens the reader’s consciousness of the cultural constructedness of
such a taken-for-granted thing as a calendar” (280). In Burkean terms, Lee offers a version of the
Chinese calendar that identifies only synecdochally with the American one. Lee offers not a
cleanly interpretable conception of Chinese time, but suggests a loose, rough hand sketch. This
looseness does not persuade American readers that holidays, birthdays, or hobbies can easily be
made consubstantial with American counterparts. A, Chinese culture, only provisionally
identifies with B, American culture.
About midway through the text, Lee describes religion in China with the same careful
tentativeness with which he describes its calendar, yet this description also demonstrates a
second type of non-identification. After pointing out that readers cannot approach Chinese
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religion the same way they approach Christianity, Lee explains that Taoism, for example, can
only be identified multivalently. Taoism cannot be seen as organized or central, but as broad
array of heterogeneous practices. “Taoism was formerly a pure system of philosophy, but...by
degrees…[it] borrowed its doctrines from Buddhism and Confucianism and has had engrafted
upon it from time to time innumerable” forms of belief (65). In fact, Taoism resists singular
descriptors or labels, because “almost everything imaginable is worshipped by the Taoists and
those who believe in the efficacy of their intercessions,” says Lee. (65-66). Further, there is no
systematized way to indoctrinate nor interpolate children into religion in general, not just
Taoism. Of course, “boys and girls pick up some religious ideas in their intercourse with those
about them,” yet there is an “utter neglect of religious training of the young” (70). “Nobody ever
deliberately sits down to tell them of this god and that god, their origin, character and power”
(70). Here, Lee may hope to dispel myths regarding how Chinese idol worship, yet it is clear Lee
identifies religion in China as expansive and heterogeneous, as identifiable only as multiple or
plural.
Whereas in this second type of non-identification, Lee multiplies the identities he claims
as his own, he also employs a third type of non-identification as he dissolves identifications that
fail to articulate that holistic nature of the self. Throughout the autobiography, Lee portrays
China not only through positive terms, such as ‘China can be seen as’ but through negative terms
as ‘China cannot be seen as’ This negative tense functions as a means to dissolve erase an
association between cultures as it insists on approaching each as two distinct, self-coherent
entities without the assistance of language. For example, Lee describes what Chinese boys do
with leisure time but dissolves any potential comparisons between American sports and Chinese
hobbies. Chinese boys play nothing like American sports: they have “nothing according to baseball, foot-ball, cricket, bicycle riding, skating, sliding, or tennis” (34). Chinese boys instead
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enjoy more leisurely forms of exertion such as “kite flying,” “penny-tossing,” “fishing,” or
“quail-fighting” (36, 38, 39). Lee’s rhetorical decision to introduce these activities by what they
cannot be identified as indicates that Chinese leisure exists as a distinct whole, and therefore
shed light on what Burke meant by “assertions in vacuo” (P&C 319)
Lee continually describes China “in vacuo” throughout the autobiography. About
religion, Lee says, “there is nothing in Chinese religion corresponding to the Christian Sabbath”
(68). Interestingly, Lee describes even the very day of his birth “in vacuo.” After tentatively
describing the complex and only roughly identifiable nature of the Chinese calendar, Lee
concludes that now living in America, “I have been cheated of my birthday celebration” (8). Lee
says that, like the mystic, his birthday has transcended the realm of language: “Therefore,
although I am sure that I was born on the twenty-first day or the Second Moon in Chinese, I
don’t know my exact birthday in English” (8). Here, Lee has barely introduced himself as the
book’s autobiographical protagonist, yet already he asserts language cannot broach even simple
concepts as his birth. In fact, although he mentions his name in American English may be
referred to as “Yan Phou,” Lee never provides readers with his birth name. The only details Lee
gives us is that he received his birth name one month after his birth, and that he now “[arranges
his] name in accordance with American custom” (8-9).
These non-identificatory approaches to Lee’s When I Was A Boy in China at times appear
subtle or brief. Ultimately, Lee hoped his American audiences would welcome Chinese
immigrants, and he knew they would succeed to the extent they identified their culture with
America’s. Yet, Lee recognized that greater cultural or racial identification sometimes came as
Asians identified themselves as Americans only tenuously identified themselves, as plural and
multiple, or sometimes, because of their holism, without identifying themselves at all.
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Although Lee’s text might be better served with a more panoramic analysis, the
introduction I have provided to Lee’s autobiography highlights patterns Lee turns to consistently.
As a whole, Lee’s text can be read as an attempt to simultaneously forge and complicate
American identification of Chinese immigrants. While Lee hopes Americans embrace Chinese
culture, he also hopes they do not come away from the text thinking they have understood what
it’s like to grow up a boy in China—he does not hope they have made ‘A consubstantial with B.’
Instead, he hopes that A has roughly approximated B, just as the human experience living in Asia
roughly approximates the human experience in America, that A might be more polyphonous than
B just as China is not reducible to America, and that A cannot be made consubstantial with
anything, just as Chinese culture resists interpretation, signification, or identification.
Rhetoric’s Relevance: Burke’s identification
Lee is up to much more than simply rhetorical listening in his important autobiography.
While Lee hopes his readers will apply the careful listening Ratcliffe describes, he also takes
measures to write in a similar non-identificatory fashion as described by Burke. Reading Burke
through Ratcliffe, and then reading both rhetorical theorists through Asian America, informs how
this early Asian American immigrant navigates a skeptical, often racist, and sometimes violent
American culture in order to provide a more hospitable and self-authorized image of himself.
But not only does non-identification per Burke and Ratcliffe inform Lee’s strategic
ambiguity, my reading of Burke in combination with Ratcliffe also informs Burke’s original
description of identification. Even though not all rhetorical scholars see Burke’s “synecdoche
function,” a term he described in a Philosophy of Literary Form, in connection with
identification, a term he described in A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke may have seen these wouldbe disparate theories as two separate accounts of the same process. In the Philosophy of Literary
Form, Burke does not use the term identification, yet he does say that “The word ‘identified’ also
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suggests the importance of the name as an important aspect of synecdoche” (146). In fact, Burke
sounds much like his poststructuralist critics when he says that the “labeling” of “such
protagonists as He or Man” constitutes the “problem of identity” (27). Although Burke may not
answer this problem of identity in the same way as his critics, Burke hardly can be called an
essentialist.
Accordingly, reading identification as non-identification reveals that Burke envisions
identification to communicate much more than the workings of the powerful or hegemonic. In
fact, although critics most commonly cite his description of identification in A Rhetoric, Burke
says earlier in this work that identification can describe strategies of the mystic. Identification
ranged “from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through
courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon” (xiv). Identification ranges “from the
politician” who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, “‘I was a farm boy myself,’” and it
might also describe the workings of power and hegemony through “the mysteries of social
status” (xiv). But importantly, identification describes how “the mystic’ identifies “with the
source of all being,” which includes the disintegrating tendency of art, the synecdoche function,
or any other approach that refers to the self as non-identifiable (RM xiv). These descriptions of
identification contrast harshly against later descriptions of identification as ‘compensatory to
division’ through consubstantiation, yet here in A Rhetoric, Burke explicitly links what looks
much like inventive non-identification to his key term identification. In this sense, what Asian
American scholars call non-identification, Burke may simply refer to as identification.
Ultimately, my work reconfiguring non-identification demonstrates one way a rhetorician
might practice Asian American studies or studies of any number of other marginal groups
struggling to navigate the rhetoric of identity. Recovering Burke and then pairing him with
Ratcliffe demonstrates a particular recovery methodology, one that illustrates how rhetorical
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scholars might turn back to the rhetorical tradition to perform similar types of revision. The term
Identification has been revised and revisited, ignored and revitalized continuously since Burke’s
introduction of the term to rhetorical studies, and scholars might well continue to interpret and
reinterpret this term. Kenneth Burke is, in fact, the father of modern rhetorical theory, and his
insights should continue to illuminate our investigation of rhetorical studies. In particular, Asian
American studies might put a great deal of rhetorical scholarship from the rhetorical tradition to
use beyond just Burke. Because rhetorical scholars, unique from the literary, the philosophical,
or the historical, can claim the rhetorical tradition as their own, they should continue to show
how its rich history continues to shed light on new topics, trends, and problems.
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